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Abstract—Online data backup services provide durable storage
for user data without the hassle of traditional backup solutions,
but comfort comes at a price. In this paper we focus on the costs
of online data backup. First, we survey existing online backup
pricing models: we compare unlimited and pro rata data plans,
then we propose a novel, risk-based pricing scheme which suits
risk-conscious users. Second, we build a simple Backup Selection
Game where users can choose among these three cloud-based
pricing schemes and the cost imposed by participating in a peer-
to-peer backup system. We show that rational users generally
prefer the pro rata scheme, irrespective of the characteristics
of individual users. On the other hand, heterogeneous equilibria
may also emerge under certain distributions of data volume per
user, due to the effect of buying storage in bulk. We also discuss
how peer-to-peer backup could emerge under a more elaborate
cost model.
I. INTRODUCTION
Backing up data is a vital, but potentially tedious process for
both the everyday user and the large enterprise. Especially for
home systems, most backup solutions require some technical
savvy which can be prohibitive for the user. Luckily, virtualiza-
tion technologies and plummeting hardware costs have enabled
easy-to-use and high availability cloud storage services. In
fact, services like Dropbox, Google Drive, Amazon S3 and
Microsoft OneDrive are extremely popular and immensely
successful in sharing and synchronizing data among devices,
taking advantage of pervasive Internet connectivity.
Despite their success, cloud storage solutions have also
demonstrated some shortcomings: data loss owing to inter-
dependent failures [20], security mishaps due to configuration
errors [26], or potential data theft [4]. One can argue that
usability issues have now been solved, and harmful events are
mostly mitigated by the evolution of cloud technology and
emerging best-practices in managing these systems; however,
there is one factor that never really goes away, namely the cost
of storing large amounts of data over long periods of time.
While the cost of storage per gigabyte is decreasing rapidly,
the amount of data to be stored, analyzed and transmitted
is doubling every two years. Big data means storage costs
are likely to become and stay a significant component of IT
budgets in the coming years.
Indeed, economic factors may lead to storage services
shutting down in the future, similarly to what has happened
to Drop.io [15]. In order to counter such events, and as an
alternative to centralized online storage, peer-to-peer (P2P)
and hybrid backup systems have been proposed [23]. While
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such systems may not be optimal for generic, remote file-
system like operation, they are a good fit for data backup.
In data backup, focus is shifted from data availability to data
durability, i.e., guaranteeing that data are not lost. This comes
with less stringent requirements in regard to access restrictions,
adding redundancy, and since data is read only during a restore
operation triggered by a disk failure, looser time limits. While
P2P backup services are architecturally different, we argue that
potential users are only interested in getting value for their
money. This leaves cost as the deciding factor for choosing a
given backup service.
In this paper we investigate pricing and competition in
the online data backup market. Our contribution is twofold.
First, we survey the pricing methods of existing online backup
services. We observe the proliferation of unlimited data plans,
and empirically approximate the average data volume per user
as expected by the corresponding service providers. Moreover,
we propose a novel, risk-based pricing scheme. Second, we
build a simple Backup Selection Game, where users can
choose among three cloud-based and one P2P pricing schemes.
We show that all users choosing the pro rata scheme is
a favorable equilibrium irrespective of the characteristics of
individual users. However, heterogeneous equilibria may also
emerge under certain distributions of data volume per user,
due to the effect of buying storage in bulk. We discuss how
P2P backup could emerge under a more elaborate cost model.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II
surveys the market for online backup services and establishes
empirical inputs to our pricing model. Section III builds a sim-
ple game-theoretic model and analyzes its potential equilibria.
Section IV discusses the limitations of our model and outlines
potential future work. Finally, Section V concludes the paper.
II. ONLINE DATA BACKUP: TECHNOLOGY AND PRICING
An online backup service provides users with an Internet-
based system for backing up their files regularly (usually
incrementally) and for restoring them in case of a hard disk
failure. The goal of an online data backup system is to provide
long-term and reliable (i.e., durable) storage for user data. This
means they guarantee that data are not lost, but do not take the
responsibility for availability, folder synchronization and such,
which are characteristics of remote file-system like services
such as Dropbox or Google Drive. Simply put, data from
the provider are only read when a restore command is sent,
implying a disk failure at the customer’s premises. Adding to
this, the restore process is not time-critical, especially that it
requires the transfer of potentially huge amounts of data.
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Fig. 1. Online backup services: prices vs. storage caps
A. Cloud backup: existing vs. potential pricing schemes
The most prominent of today’s services use some form
of cloud storage, providing an easy-to-use, dependable and
reasonably priced solution. These services are usually accessed
via a client software, which needs some configuration during
installation, but runs automatically later on. This client soft-
ware takes care of compression, encryption and data transfer.
There are many service offerings on the market, each of them
with a slightly different feature set based on the same core
functionality. There are companies targeting specific market
segments (enterprise or home users), but a lot of them serve
all kinds of users differentiating via service levels. As it is
common with online markets, backup providers usually offer
a free/trial version of their services with limited storage space
or no customer support to guide the users towards premium
but paid versions or integrated targeted advertising. We ignore
these alternatives and concentrate on companies which actually
make money on providing a backup service. Here, we present
a brief market survey [1].
Pro rata and tiered pricing. There are two online giants
who offer clear usage-based (pro rata) pricing. Amazon has
priced its Glacier backup service at $0.12 per gigabyte per year
[5]. Google offers its Durable Reduced Availability (DRA)
storage for double the price at $0.24 per gigabyte per year
[16]. Smaller providers usually offer different tiers instead,
e.g., Acronis, also a player on the home backup software
market offers 1 TB for $189.99 per year ($0.19 per GB per
year), 500 GB for $99.99 per year and 250 GB for $49.99 per
year ($0.2 per GB per year); one caveat is that you also have
to buy the client software for $49.99 [3].
Unlimited. A large number of companies offer unlimited
plans, usually with some technical restrictions. These include
policies on the number of computers, external hard drives and
fair usage. One of the more popular providers, BackBlaze
offers unlimited durable data backup (guaranteed for 50 years)
for $5 per month ($60 per year), $50 per year or $95 per 2-
year period ($47.5 per year) [7]. This plan is limited to one
computer, although external hard drives connected to the same
computer are allowed. Another company, CrashPlan offers a 2-
year unlimited plan restricted to a single computer for $114.99
($57.49 per year) and a 10-computer subscription of the same
length for $289.99 (coming down to $14.99 per computer per
year) [14]. One of the more interesting policies comes from
MyPCBackup [19], who warns customers subscribed to their
unlimited plan that the company may request them to transfer
from the unlimited plan, if the company believes they are a
business or that they have exceeded the company’s fair usage
policy. They also state that it is under MyPCBackup’s sole
discretion to judge that situation.
How much is “unlimited” anyway? Since backup
providers have to buy or rent storage capacity to satisfy
customer demand, they estimate the average “unlimited” data
volume per user in order to operate efficiently and profitably.
This raises the question: how much is “unlimited”? In order to
get an answer, we have collected price quotes for 74 different
data plans including 24 with unlimited data volume. Next,
we plot their yearly prices against their storage caps, while
assuming provider-estimated data caps for unlimited plans.
Results are depicted in Figure 1 with three different esti-
mates for unlimited. We also plot the pure pro rata prices of
Amazon Glacier, which is the cheapest solution also likely
to be used by resellers. Note that, the bulk of the non-
unlimited data points are to the left from the 1 TB line. More
convincingly, in Figure 1(b), the relation between the Amazon
Glacier price curve and the frontier for unlimited plans seems
like the closest fit, taking into account the potential reselling
of Glacier resources towards customers. From these figures
we could guess that providers estimate the average “unlimited
user” to have a data cap slightly below 1 TB. Note that this toy
estimation assumes cost-based pricing with zero profit margin,
and ignores costs other than for storage.
A post-pay, risk-based pricing scheme. Both unlimited
and pro rata are insurance-type pricing schemes: users pay in
advance (whether in annual or monthly installments) acknowl-
edging and mitigating the risk of data loss. Providers can then
calculate their prices based on the estimated data volume they
have to store and potentially restore. We could reverse this
thought process; what if the risk of data loss is deemed so
low by users that they are willing to pay for it fully, but only
when it actually happens? There is a twist in this operation
mode in the case of data backup: no matter how and when the
user pays, actual backups has to be made in order for lost data
to be recovered some time in the future. Given an analogy to
buying/not buying full-coverage car insurance, the difference
is that the data backup company and the user have to sign a
contract, and the company should start providing the service
before the failure happens to enable future restoration.
Now, we let the providers calculate the risk of data loss
per user, and give them a price quote accordingly; this is the
price users have to pay in the event of an actual disk failure at
their premises. Obviously, providers have to somehow measure
the risk: this could be based on industry standard disk drive
failure rate metrics. There are several metrics around including
the best-known Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF), a
statistical term expressing the service hours between failures.
Due to some issues with this metric, the hard disk industry
has switched to Annual Failure Rate (AFR) [17], which
specifies the probable percent of failures per year; AFR is
based on the actually installed base of the given hard disk
type. Furthermore, AFR presents providers with an easy-to-use
metric when it comes to service plans. In order to get actual
numbers, we turn to an in-depth study published by BackBlaze
[18]. The study shows that drives exhibit an AFR of 1% to
10% in general with significant variations across brands but
without a clear trend tied to capacity. The takeaway is that
the price the provider should charge an unlucky user for the
restoration of roughly one disk of data has to cover the storage
costs of data on ca. 100 user disks per year.
B. P2P backup
P2P backup services have appeared in many forms recently;
some of them are still operational. Here we give a short
explanation on how P2P backup works, present the most
important ones of such systems, and estimate their costs.
Technology. In a P2P backup system a user’s data is always
encrypted, split up to small chunks and redundancy encoded
before leaving the local hardware [23]. Then the encrypted,
redundant backup chunks are scattered on disks of fellow
subscribers around the world. Each user has to add additional
local storage capacity to their local hardware to store the
backup data of other users also accounting for churn (users
going offline/online), a characteristic of P2P systems. Apart
from the cost of purchasing (and operating) these storage
disk(s) there should be no extra cost to the service.
Existing solutions. Wuala [25] was the first commercial
solution that allowed its users to offer storage capacity on
their disks instead of paying for data backup. Wuala monitored
the online availability of its users, checked their uplink and
downlink capacities, and determined the volume of data the
user could back up according to the offered storage space.
Spacemonkey [21], a Kickstarter project in 2013, ships an
external storage device to its subscribers providing the user
with 1 TB of storage; afterwards the P2P service costs $10 per
month or $49 per year. Following the same concept, Connected
Data [13] offers dedicated devices called Transporter and
Transporter Sync to users who want to join their P2P backup
network for $159 and $99. Neither of those include any hard
drives. Symform [22], an otherwise regular online backup
service provider, offers, similarly to Wuala, the possibility of
contributing storage space instead of paying for cloud storage.
If the user allocates 2 TB of storage on its device, it receives 1
TB of storage for data backup at the provider. Finally the last
group of P2P backup solutions include those that give away the
backup software, with the user being responsible for providing
the hardware. Both CrashPlan [14] and BuddyBackup [9]
make their application freely available, which periodically
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Fig. 2. Disk prices in November 2014
detects changes in files, incrementally encodes them, encrypts
the data, and uploads pieces of it to a predefined list of hosts
over the Internet.
Cost. All P2P backup solutions incur storage device costs,
hence we collected the lowest prices for disks of various
capacity at BestBuy [8], a major US retailer. As it is shown in
Figure 2, in 2014 the end customer can buy storage disks for
almost as low as $30 per TB. Note that we have picked the
cheapest hardware, although we did not see much difference
between the prices of disks of form factor 2.5" and 3.5",
or internal and external disks. Assuming a negligible cost of
power and a disk amortization period of 5 years, the cost of
having 1 GB of storage space is ¢0.6 per year or ¢0.05 per
month. Note that tape prices are even lower (e.g., an LTO
Ultrium 6 cartridge holds 2.5 TB and sells for about $50),
but they require a costly apparatus, hence we ignore them. By
taking the price of 1 GB of durable storage at Amazon Glacier
as reference, it is a bit of a surprise why P2P data backup
has not gained significant momentum so far: ¢1 vs. ¢0.05 per
month is a 20-fold difference. In Section III we try to find an
answer to this question from an economic perspective.
III. THE BACKUP SELECTION GAME (BSG)
After our market survey, we are now ready to build our
pricing model and game.
A. Assumptions
We have made several simplifications to construct a tractable
model. We assume cost-based pricing with a zero profit
margin, and account only for storage costs. We model the
pricing schemes as different providers, and we assume that
each provider is capable of serving the whole market. We
ignore free data plans and per computer pricing, and we view
tiered plans as special cases of pro rata, hence do not analyze it
as a separate scheme. We ignore compression and redundancy
in data storage, as different schemes will likely employ similar
measures. We do not cover the temporal evolution of the online
backup market, and opt for a single shot game; hence we also
ignore providers having downtimes or going out of business.
Finally, we model the users as rational decision-makers, and
do not cover behavioral aspects. The implications of some of
these assumptions are presented in Section IV.
Unit price of storage. We build function p(x), the estimated
yearly cost of storing data volume x, on Amazon Glacier’s pro
rata price and fit a logarithmic curve to the decay of Amazon
S3 [6] prices vs. storage demand. We also account for the
actual disk prices that are 20 times cheaper than Glacier prices
(assuming 5-year amortization). This way p(x) yields ¢0.6 as
the annual unit cost of 1 GB storage, ¢0.588/GB for 1 TB and¢0.576/GB for 1000 TB. Function p(x) is given as follows:
p(x) = 12 · (0.03− 2 · 104 log(x))/(3 · 20).
Disk failure rate. We define the disk failure function r(x)
to be as simple as possible. We assume an AFR of 1% and the
usage of 4 TB user disks at user premises as they represent
both the cheapest (per capacity unit) and most reliable storage
alternative today. We argue that users with more data pose a
larger risk owing to more/larger disks. Then the probability
of more then zero failed disks out of n, by neglecting further
elements of the binomial formula, is P(i > 0) = 1 − P(i =
0) = 1 − (1− p)n ≈ np. For a given user, n is calculated out
of x by assuming 4 TB disks, so r(x) is given as follows:
r(x) = 0.01 · x/(4 · 1024).
B. Players, strategies, cost functions
The players of BSG are users who want to use online backup
services. Users are characterized by their backup data volume.
Strategies of BSG simply consist of choosing from four avail-
able pricing schemes (and hence four “providers”): unlimited,
pro rata, post-pay and P2P. For each pricing scheme we define
a cost function. In the case of cloud backup strategies, i.e.,
unlimited, pro rata and post-pay, we model the total cost of
the service provider as proportional to the aggregate volume
of backed up user data. The difference between these three
schemes is how the total cost is dispersed among users. The
P2P strategy does not involve a central provider, users only
pay for their own hardware.
Unlimited. The unlimited scheme distributes the total cost
equally, with the total cost being p
(∑
i∈U xi
)∑
i∈U xi, where
xi is the volume of backup data of user i, p(x) is the non-
increasing unit price function of storage for capacity x, and U
is the set of users who choose the unlimited scheme. Therefore
the cost of participation is:
ci = p
(∑
j∈U
xj
) ∑
j∈U xj
|U | ∀i ∈ U. (1)
Pro rata. Those who choose the pro rata scheme, consti-
tuting the user set denoted by R, pay as they go:
ci = p
(∑
j∈R
xj
)
xi ∀i ∈ R. (2)
Post-pay. In the post-pay pricing scheme, only users, who
are actually hit with a disk error and retrieve their backup
from the provider, pay. In this case, the division of costs is
based both on the volume of data and the failure rate r(x),
a non-decreasing function of the underlying volume of data.
Hence the probabilistic cost of user i who belongs to this set
O is:
ci =
∑
j∈O
xj · p
(∑
j∈O
xj
)
r (xi)xi∑
j∈O r (xj)xj
∀i ∈ O. (3)
P2P. Finally, the users of the P2P network, denoted by P ,
pay only for the disk they contribute:
ci = p (xi)xi ∀i ∈ P. (4)
C. Homogeneous equilibria
Naturally, we are interested in the Nash equilibria of the
game above. As expected from the structure of the cost
(payoff) functions, the number of users choosing the same
scheme will be a main factor in deciding the stable outcome.
First, let us investigate the special cases, where all users are
grouped together in the same scheme.
Proposition 1. (Unlimited NE) The strategy profile of all users
selecting the unlimited scheme is a (weak) Nash equilibrium
iff ∀i ci = p
(∑
j∈U xj
) ∑
j∈U xj
|U| ≤ p(xi)xi.
Proof. (sketch) If a single user deviated from the strategy
profile, its cost would be p(xi)xi in either one of the other
schemes. If the condition above holds, no users have the
incentive to deviate. On the contrary, if the condition did
not hold, at least one user would have the incentive to
deviate unilaterally, since switching to either one of the three
remaining strategies would decrease her cost.
An example for this situation is when all users have the
same volume of data: ∀j xj = xi. In this case, all users pay
ci =
p(
∑
j∈U xj)
∑
j∈U xj
|U| = p
(∑
j∈U xj
)
xi < p(xi)xi, since
p(x) is monotone decreasing. Note that if there are users with
significantly less data than the average, those would switch to
other schemes, avoiding the subsidization of heavy users.
Proposition 2. (Post-pay NE) The strategy profile of all users
selecting the post-pay scheme is a (weak) Nash equilibrium iff
∀i ci =∑j∈O xj · p(∑j∈O xj) r(xi)xi∑
j∈O r(xj)xj
≤ p(xi)xi.
Proof. The same as in Proposition 1.
An example for this situation is the same as for Proposition
1. Generally, if the heaviest users have only slightly more data
than average users, post-pay NE can emerge.
Theorem 1. (Pro rata NE) For any data volume distribution
(x0, ..., xn), where ∀i xi > 0 and n is the number of users,
the strategy profile of all users selecting the pro rata scheme
is a (strong) Nash equilibrium.
Proof. (sketch) In this case, any given user would pay ci =
p
(∑
j∈R xj
)
xi. If one of them deviated and chose either one
of the remaining three schemes, her cost would change to
ci
∗ = p(xi)xi. Now, ci < ci∗ for any user i, since the function
p(x) is monotone decreasing.
All users choosing the pro rata scheme equals to a propor-
tionally fair allocation of costs, and is a NE for any sensible
user population. Note that situations depicted in Proposition 1
and 2, are close-to-fair allocations. In the special case of all
users having the same data volume, the unlimited and post-pay
schemes converge to the pro rata scheme.
Theorem 2. (P2P NE) For any data volume distribution
(x0, ..., xn), where ∀i xi > 0 and n is the number of users,
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Fig. 3. Cost vs. data volume in homogeneous equilibria with uniform data
volume distribution
the strategy profile of all users selecting the P2P scheme is a
(weak) Nash equilibrium.
Proof. (sketch) Here, each user has the same cost ci = p(xi)xi.
If a single user wants to deviate from the strategy profile, her
cost would be exactly the same under the unlimited, pro rata
and post-pay strategies.
We can notice that the individual costs and the total system
cost in the P2P NE are higher than in the pro rata NE. In
fact, for Nash equilibria presented in Proposition 1 and 2
and Theorem 1, the total equilibrium cost equals to the social
optimum. This follows from the fact that the unlimited, post-
pay and pro rata NE realize the same optimal total system
cost among the users, capitalizing on the lowest possible
unit storage price. On the other hand, the P2P scheme does
not benefit from the economies of scale from buying storage
capacity in bulk. Thus, we can readily characterize the Price
of Anarchy (PoA, the fraction of total cost in social optimum
vs. in the worst-case equilibrium) and the Price of Stability
(PoS, the fraction of total cost in social optimum vs. in the
best-case equilibrium).
Corollary 1. (PoA and PoS) In the Backup Selection Game,
the Price of Anarchy is
p
(∑
i xi
)∑
i xi∑
i p (xi)xi
, and the Price of
Stability is 1.
In Figure 3 we visualize the cost against the volume
of backup data in all four pricing schemes, assuming that
every user (1000 in this example) selects the same scheme
(data volumes are uniformly distributed). It is clear that the
unlimited scheme favors the heavy users, and the post-pay
scheme the light users. The total income of the central provider
schemes is always the same (the total storage cost), and the
P2P scheme is always costlier then the pro rata scheme, due
to the decreased storage unit price when purchasing in bulk.
D. Data volume distribution and heterogeneous equilibria
Simulation: different distributions of x. Here we study
the effects of applying various distributions of the volume
of backup data across users. We consider the value of x
throughout the user set to be drawn from a uniform, normal
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or Pareto distribution. We set the minimum volume of backup
to min = 10 GB, the maximum to max = 10 TB per user;
if a randomly generated parameter falls outside this segment,
we set it to the minimum or maximum, respectively. For the
normal distribution, we set the mean to max+min
2
and the
variance to max−min
6
. For the Pareto distribution, we set the
shape parameter to max+min
max−min , so the mean approaches those
of the uniform and normal distribution.
We wonder if a heterogeneous Nash equilibrium across
pricing schemes can emerge from the game. Our motivation
is that light users seem to pay less with the post-pay scheme,
heavy users usually prefer a flat-rate unlimited offering, while
medium users could be best off with a usage-based (pro rata)
scheme. We refer the reader to Figure 4: here 10, 000 users
are distributed evenly across schemes and uniformly in data
volume. Light users assigned to post-pay, medium users to
pro rata and heavy users to unlimited schemes, respectively.
Could there be an equilibrium similar to this setting?
Now, we run iterative simulations (1000 rounds) in which
the users select their best response strategies sequentially in
a heuristic, simulated annealing manner: there is a certain
amount of randomness in which strategy they choose in each
round, but it gradually diminishes by the end of the simulation.
This is necessary in order to avoid artifacts of the initial
selection of pricing schemes: at start each user is randomly
assigned to given schemes with equal probability. We find that
no matter what the volume distribution is, the final market
will not be segmented: all data volume distributions (uniform,
normal, Pareto) lead to the monopoly of the pro rata provider.
Distributions with tiers. Now, we turn to distributions of
x, where there are clearly distinguishable tiers. We consider
a scenario with 112 users, where 102 light users have data
volume of x1 = 1 TB and choose the post-pay scheme, while
10 heavy users have x2 = 10 TB and choose the pro rata
scheme. In this case light users will not deviate to either pro
rata with c1∗ or unlimited with c1∗∗: c1 = 102·p(102)102 = p(102) <
c1
∗ = p(101) < c1∗∗ = p(1). For heavy users, c2 = p(100) ·10 <
c2
∗ = p(10) · 10 < c2∗∗ = 112·p(112)·100202 = p(112) · 55.44, thus
they will not deviate either (c2∗∗ being the post-pay and c2∗ the
unlimited costs). Hence this allocation is a heterogeneous Nash
equilibrium with users allocated to two different strategies.
Conjecture 1. (Heterogeneous NE) For any strategy profile
(s1, . . . , sn), excluding the coexistence of P2P and pro rata,
there exists an underlying distribution of user backup volumes
x such as (s1, . . . , sn) is a Nash equilibrium.
Note that the distribution of user backup volumes x has to
satisfy specific requirements with regard to appropriately sized
gaps in data volumes. We leave the more formal expression
and proof of this conjecture to future work.
IV. DISCUSSION
Here we list and discuss some limitations of our model.
Provider cost and revenue model. By concentrating on
storage cost only, we have simplified the cost model of
providers. In reality, these providers face several other types
of cost owing to egress/ingress bandwidth, power, mainte-
nance, emergency upgrades and unused capacity [2]. On the
other hand, we have also assumed that revenues only cover
costs, hence the profit of providers is zero. While these
simplifications do not affect the competition among cloud
providers, they do have a profound effect on the proliferation
of P2P backup. We have seen that buying in bulk assures the
superiority of pro rata over P2P in Section III-C. However,
if we factor in other costs and a profit margin for central
providers (represented by a coefficient α), it could be enough
to tip the market towards P2P. More precisely, P2P dominates
pro rata if ∀i ci = α · p
(∑
j∈R xi
)
xi > p(xi)xi. In fact,
depending on the bulk capacity price decay, a coefficient as
low as α = 2 is sufficient for the market to tip with all uniform,
normal and Pareto backup volume distributions.
Users like flat-rate. Several studies conducted in the con-
text of Internet access showed that users prefer simple flat-rate
pricing, e.g. [24]. It is also well-known, however, that Internet
access providers are not satisfied with flat-rate pricing, since
it has resulted in declining sales volumes, shrinking markets
and a shift in competition from service quality to price [12].
Adding to this, the steep growth in fixed and especially mobile
Internet traffic makes it even harder to maintain all-you-can-
eat pricing. Transferring this line of thought to online data
backup, it seems that backup providers are also facing the same
problem. Cloud storage costs will never reach zero: adding
a user represents a low marginal cost, but at a given point
the provider has to make a sizable investment for expanding
its infrastructure, resulting in a significant fixed cost [10].
This could make backup providers experiment with pro rata,
value-based, risk-based or other smart pricing schemes, even
though they might be slightly too complicated for the user
to understand. Raising the price of unlimited plans is not a
solution due to the competition in the market [1].
Realistic distribution of user data volumes. It is clear
from our analysis that the distribution of data volume to be
backed up dictates the evolution of the market. Distributions
with observable tiers might emerge: storage media are avail-
able in only a few well-defined sizes and this shapes the
backup demand of the user to a certain extent. Also, there
are studies with regard to residential Internet traffic which
imply the existence of a heavy-tailed, Pareto-like distribution
for user traffic demand, see [11]. Extrapolating from these two
observations, we argue that the real-world distribution could
also exhibit a Pareto-like slope on a few actual values with
non-negligible probability. Interestingly, such a distribution
could potentially enable the coexistence of multiple pricing
schemes in a market equilibrium. Nevertheless, obtaining a
real-world dataset from an online backup provider would be
the ultimate way to clear the remaining uncertainties.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have studied some facets of the market
for online data backup. First, we showed the proliferation of
unlimited data plans and presented a cost-based approximation
of how providers could perceive “unlimited”. Second, we
constructed an empirically rooted, simple Backup Selection
Game, where rational users select their providers based strictly
on price. We found that among the four competing pricing
schemes – unlimited, pro rata, post-pay and P2P – users
generally prefer pro rata independent of the underlying dis-
tribution of data volume per user. In special cases, equilibria
with multiple pricing schemes may also emerge under certain
distributions of individual data volume, due to the effect of
buying storage in bulk. Although the P2P scheme does not
fare well in our simple game, we discuss how it could emerge
under a more elaborate cost model.
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